Constitutionally Regulating Telephone
Harassment: An Exercise in Statutory
Precision
M. Sean Royallt

INTRODUCTION

For many years our society has benefited from the telephone
as an inexpensive means of instantaneous communication. It provides convenient and virtually unlimited access to people wherever
they may work or reside, but this capability can also make the telephone an "instrument for inflicting incalculable fear, abuse, annoyance, hardship, disgust, and grief on innocent victims."'
Most states and the federal government have enacted statutes
that criminalize forms of telephone harassment.2 Yet the offense is
not one which lends itself to precise statutory definition. At least
not without either incidentally prohibiting expression that is protected by the First Amendment (the problem of "overbreadth") or
defining the prohibited conduct so imprecisely as to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's ban on vague laws (the problem of
"vagueness"). 3 The majority of telephone harassment statutes have
been challenged on one or both of these bases, and many statutes
have been invalidated. From the legislators' point of view matters
have only been made worse by the courts which have reviewed
these statutes, relying as they have on highly procedural holdings
and offering little in the way of substantive guidance.
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B.S., Texas A & M University, 1986; J.D. Candidate 1990, The University of Chicago.
HR Rep No 1109, 90th Cong, 2d Sess 2 (1968), in 1968 USCCAN 1915, 1916.
See, for example, the Connecticut telephone harassment statute, Conn Gen Stat Ann

§

53a-183(a)(3) (West 1985)(upheld in Gormley v Director,Connecticut State Dept. of Probation, 632 F2d 938, 940 (2d Cir 1980)). See also the federal telephone harassment statute,
47 USC § 223(a)(1)(1982 & Supp 1986)(upheld in United States v Lampley, 573 F2d 783,
786-87 (3d Cir 1978)). For a condensed summary of the various state statutes regulating
telephone harassment, see Comment, A Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 Va L Rev
507, 535-44 (1984).

1 For an overview of how the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have been applied to
telephone harassment statutes, see Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
State Criminal Statutes Forbidding Use of Telephone to Annoy or Harass,95 ALR3d 411
(1979); Annotation, Prohibition of Obscene or HarassingTelephone Calls in Interstate or
Foreign Communications Under 47 USCS § 223, 50 ALR Fed 541 (1980).
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This Comment explores the constitutional issues that legislators confront when they attempt to proscribe harassing non-commercial telephone calls 4 and seeks to guide the difficult legislative
task of regulating harassing telephone calls in a way consistent
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Section I reviews the
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines and shows that the courts'
flawed application of the doctrines to telephone harassment statutes has created nothing but uncertainty. Overbreadth and vagueness focus on procedure-not substance. These doctrines do not
define what types of substantive expression the government may
restrict, but rather, monitor how the government may go about the
business of regulating without violating the substantively defined
boundaries of protected speech. In reviewing telephone harassment
statutes, however, the courts have tried to determine whether such
statutes reach beyond the bounds of legitimate regulation into the
realm of protected expression without first determining what types
of telephonic expression are indeed protected. They have invalidated statutes in order to protect the substance of the First
Amendment without first determining what, in the context of telephone communication, that substance is.
After exploring the judiciary's flawed application of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, section II answers the primary,
albeit neglected, question: To what extent may the state, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, regulate expression in the context of harassing telephone calls? 5 This Comment
argues that the State's authority to regulate harassing calls derives
from the need to protect unwilling recipients from offensive intrusions of privacy. Thus the State's regulatory authority should extend only to cases where a caller invades, in an "essentially intolerable manner," the "substantial privacy interests" of the recipient.
Finally, section III proposes a model statute based on the
standards and guidelines developed in section II. Among the
unique features of the statute are its treatment of speech restric-

Commercial telephone harassment raises distinct constitutional issues. See Note, Give
Me a Home Where No Salesmen Phone: Telephone Solicitation and the FirstAmendment,
7 Hastings Const L Q 129, 136-38 (1979).
' The Supreme Court has not yet answered this question. In fact, it has denied certiorari to two cases posing this problem: Gormley v Director, Connecticut State Dept. of Probation, 632 F2d 938 (2d Cir 1980), cert denied, 449 US 1023 (1980); and Thorne v Bailey,
846 F2d 241 (4th Cir 1988), cert denied, 109 S Ct 538 (1988). In dissenting from the denial
of certiorari in Gormley, Justice White noted the wide disagreement among state courts
concerning the proper application of First Amendment principles in the area. Gormley, 449
US at 1025.
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tions in the context of intimate relationships, and its provision for
a self-executing notice remedy for recipients of harassing calls.
OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS AS APPLIED BY THE COURTS

I.

A legislator preparing to draft a law regulating expression naturally looks to the courts for guidance, seeking to avoid categories
of speech already determined by the courts to be constitutionallyprotected. He knows that a law capable of intruding on one of
those categories may be held overbroad. Yet in the telephonic expression context, no court has defined the parameters of such a
category; consequently, the legislator does not know the limits
placed on his proscriptive powers by the First Amendment. He
must beware of crossing a border whose existence the courts have
posited, but whose location they have not yet identified. Instead,
the legislator will find only numerous and conflicting decisions
striking down various statutes because their terms were deemed
vague or overbroad.
This Comment seeks to provide the substantive direction that
is currently lacking for this category of speech. Before doing so, the
Comment reviews the underpinnings of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines and examines three factors that are particularly salient to the constitutional issues posed by telephone harassment legislation: the statutory requirement of specific intent, the
distinction between conduct and speech, and the treatment of
vagueness inherent in certain statutory terminology.
A.

Overbreadth and Vagueness Doctrines
1.

Overbreadth.

A criminal statute is overbroad if it forbids not only behavior
properly subject to proscription but conduct protected by the First
Amendment as well. Overbroad laws pose two basic threats: they
may punish innocent persons for exercising their constitutional
right of free expression, and they may inhibit others from exercising that right (the so-called "chilling effect").'
The overbreadth doctrine aims to achieve regulatory precision,
requiring that "the means chosen by the legislature must be no
broader than necessary to achieve legitimate governmental purposes." 7 In this sense the doctrine focuses on procedure, not sub' Spears v State, 337 S2d 977, 980 (Fla 1976). See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 Colum L Rev 808 (1969).
" Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 S Ct Rev 1, 3.
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stance. When a court declares unconstitutional a state law prohibiting political demonstrations on public property, it places an
entire category of expression beyond the pale of government restriction. By contrast, when a court invalidates a statute because a
particular term is overbroad, it merely ensures that a category of
speech previously defined as protected is not imperiled by the imprecision of the statute. The overbreadth doctrine patrols the parameters of constitutionally-protected speech.
In the absence of an authoritative judicial construction limiting an otherwise overbroad statute to constitutional applications,8
a court may find the statute invalid on its face and in need of redrafting to excise the constitutional flaw.9 Because of the potentially unlimited scope of the overbreadth doctrine, however, many
courts refrain from strict application of the rule, refusing to invalidate a statute unless it is shown to be "substantially overbroad."'10
The Supreme Court has endorsed this restraint for the category of
cases in which a statute proscribes a mixture of speech and
conduct.1
2. Vagueness.
The vagueness doctrine declares a law unconstitutional if persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.'

2

The doctrine reflects two Four-

teenth Amendment due process concerns: first, that "no one.., be
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
8 "A statute which is facially overbroad may be authoritatively construed and restricted
to cover only conduct which is not constitutionally protected and, as so construed, the statute will thereafter be immune from attack on grounds of overbreadth." State v Thompson,
237 Kan 562, 701 P2d 694, 697 (1985).
1 A court may also find a facially valid statute unconstitutional "as applied" to an individual litigant.
10 "Substantial overbreadth" seems to require a showing of actual or serious potential
encroachments on fundamental rights. The Supreme Court has defined the standard in this
way:
[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute
is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge .... There must be
a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court for it to be facially challenged
on overbreadth grounds. Members of City Council of Los Angeles v Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 US 789, 800-01 (1984).
11 "[P]articularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to
the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 615 (1973).
" Connally v General Construction Co., 269 US 385, 391 (1926).

1989]

Regulating Telephone Harassment

1407

meaning of penal statutes";1 3 and second, that laws establish objective standards to guide executive and judicial authorities in administering justice.1 4 A concern for the uninhibited exercise of expressive rights protected by the First Amendment also underlies
the vagueness doctrine. 15 The Supreme Court has intimated, for
instance, that "stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting
effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril
here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser."'"
B.

Specific Intent

Virtually all courts upholding telephone harassment statutes
mandate that the statutes require a caller to possess a specific, culpable intent.'7 A specific intent requirement mitigates overbreadth
concerns because it narrows the scope of criminal proscriptions.18
13 Lanzetta v New Jersey, 306 US 451, 453 (1939).
' Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108-09 (1972) ("A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application."). See also Papachristouv City of Jacksonville, 405 US 156, 168 (1972).
" See Grayned, 408 US at 109 ("Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer
far wider of the unlawful zone ...
')(citations omitted); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam,
The Void-for- Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U Pa L Rev 67, 76 (1960).
16 Smith v California, 361 US 147, 151 (1959). See also Note, Vagueness Doctrine in
the Federal Courts: A Focus on the Military,Prisonand Campus Contexts, 26 Stan L Rev
855, 869-70 (1974).
17 Some statutes, however, do not require intent for telephone calls containing obscene,
lewd, or profane language because such forms of expression "are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas." Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 572 (1942). See, for example, subsection (A) of the federal statute, 47 USC § 223(a)(1)(cited in note 2 and excerpted
in note 100).
11 Legislatures and courts have employed methods in addition to a specific intent requirement to clarify the scope of telephone harassment statutes. See State v Elder, 382 S2d
687, 691-93 (Fla 1980)(call must be unwanted, unsolicited or nonconsensual); City of Everett v Moore, 37 Wash App 862, 683 P2d 617, 619 (1984) (holding statute unconstitutionally
vague, but implying result would differ if statute required recipient to take call in a place
which recipient reasonably expects to be private). For example, although anonymous calls
may contain entirely legitimate speech, they have been found to "militat[e] against any legitimate free speech communicative function," Elder, 382 S2d at 691, because anonymity is
"'a circumstance raising discomfort and fear in the receiver of the call.'" Id (quoting
United States v Darsey, 342 F Supp 311, 313 (E D Pa 1972)). See Jones v Municipality of
Anchorage, 754 P2d 275, 279 (Alaska App 1988)(anonymous calls deemed "essentially
noncommunicative"). Finally, some statutes prohibit only repetitive calls. See, for example,
State v Camp, 59 NC App 38, 295 SE2d 766, 768 (1982); Caldwell v State, 26 Md App 94,
337 A2d 476, 481 (1975); Constantino v State, 243 Ga 595, 255 SE2d 710, 713 (1979).
Courts sometimes invalidate statutes that do not require specific, culpable intent, holding that such statutes impermissibly regulate speech. See generally Walker v Dillard, 523
F2d 3, 5 (4th Cir 1975); Radford v Webb, 446 F Supp 608, 610-11 (W D NC 1978). And some
courts view intent requirements as ensuring that telephone harassment statutes do not in-
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Likewise, it overcomes statutory vagueness because it clarifies the
nature of prohibited conduct. But contrary to the view of some
courts, a specific intent requirement will not immunize telephone
harassment statutes from all constitutional infirmities.
1. The narrowing and clarifying effect of intent.
A specific intent requirement narrows the scope of telephone
harassment statutes because it requires the caller to intend to
cause the recipient actual psychic or emotional harm. Most telephone harassment statutes couple the intent requirement with an
"effect" requirement; that is, the caller must intend to "annoy,"
"harass," or "alarm" the recipient. 19 As some courts have noted,20
however, in both overbreadth and vagueness cases the utility of requiring intent depends on the definiteness of the intended "effect."
A statute requiring "intent to annoy," for instance, is arguably no
more definite than a statute with no intent requirement, because
the term "annoy" lacks clarity. Thus, in Gormley v Director,Connecticut State Dept. of Probation,2 1 a decision upholding the Connecticut telephone harassment statute,22 Judge Mansfield argued
that even though the statute in question required a specific "intent
to annoy," it would still be overbroad since it "prohibit[s] any telephone call made 'with intent to annoy' which had such effect."2 As
Judge Mansfield pointed out, people may make intentionally "annoying" telephone calls for "legitimate," "constitutionally-protected" purposes: for example, to harangue their Congressman, collect payment of a past due bill, or complain about the quality of
goods or services. 2 4 Thus, the specific intent requirement fails to
eliminate overbreadth concerns whenever the "effect" (e.g., to harfringe on constitutionally-protected expression. See State v Hagen, 27 Ariz App 722, 558
P2d 750, 753 (1976); Kinney v State, 404 NE2d 49, 51 (Ind App 1980); Bachowski v
Salamone, 139 Wis 2d 397, 407 NW2d 533, 537-38; Thorne v Bailey, 846 F2d 241, 243-44
(4th Cir 1988). But this view is by no means unanimous. See, for example, State v Anonymous, 34 Conn Supp 689, 389 A2d 1270, 1273 (1978) (addition of intent requirement in no
significant way alleviates the inhibiting effect on freedom of expression).
1 The terms chosen to define the required "effect" have a significant bearing on the
overbreadth analysis. See, for example, State v Dronso, 90 Wis 2d 110, 279 NW2d 710, 71314 (Wis App 1979).
20 See State v Blair, 287 Or 519, 601 P2d 766, 768 (1979) (en banc).
21 632 F2d 938, 942 (2d Cir 1980).
22 Conn Gen Stat Ann § 53a-183(a)(3) (cited in note 2).
22 632 F2d at 944 (Mansfield concurring) (emphasis added). Judge Mansfield also reasoned that the argument that "protected" speech is speech with a "legitimate purpose" is
circular and renders the analysis incomplete because it fails to define what types of telephonic expressions are protected by the First Amendment.
2d 269, 362 NE2d 329, 331-32 (I1 1977).
2, Id. See also People v Klick, 66 Ill
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ass, to annoy, to alarm, etc.) associated with the intent provision is
broad enough to encompass a substantial amount of protected
activity.2 5
A specific intent requirement may, however, clarify statutory
language and thereby mitigate vagueness concerns.2 6 The underlying premise is "that a person already bent on serious wrongdoing
has less need for notice and that a citizen who refrains from acting
with morally bad intent is not endangered by the statutory sanction."27 Additionally, some courts find that a specific intent requirement furnishes a more justiciable standard, since the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act no longer turns on the potentially
unpredictable, subjective reactions of the recipient, but on the specific intent of the caller. 8
2.

The problem of ambiguous intent.

Even if the courts could dispel the ambiguity of the effects
sought to be prohibited by telephone harassment regulation, they
would still have to contend with the ambiguity of intent itself. Relying on a specific intent requirement to constitutionally clarify
and narrow telephone harassment statutes presumes that a caller's
intent is constant and easily ascertained. Often, however, this is
not true. For instance, a caller may initiate a call with a legitimate
communicative purpose but at some point during the conversation
become angry and abusive.29 In the absence of aggravating factors, 30 convicting such callers would run afoul of the First and
"5At times decisions in the area have turned on semantic quibbles over, for instance,
the difference in meaning between "harass" and "annoy." Interestingly, Webster's Dictionary defines "annoy" as "to harass, esp[ecially] by quick and brief attacks." Webster's Third
World Dictionary (unabridged) 87 (Merriam-Webster, 1986). Meanwhile, the same source
defines "harass" as "to vex, trouble, or annoy continually or chronically." Id at 1031.
2 See, for example, State v Gattis, 105 NM 194, 730 P2d 497, 503 (NM App 1986);
Caldwell, 337 A2d at 483.
27 Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 Harv L Rev 77, 85
(1948), quoted in Caldwell, 337 A2d at 482. The Supreme Court gave credence to this view
in Screws v United States, 325 US 91, 101-02 (1945):
The constitutional vice in [a vague] statute is the essential injustice to the accused of
placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which the statute does not define and
hence of which it gives no warning. [Citations omitted.] But where the punishment
imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the
statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a violation of law.
28 See State v Larsen, 37 Or App 425, 588 P2d 41, 43 (1978). And see Coates v City of
Cincinnati,402 US 611, 614 (1971); Constantino, 255 SE2d at 713.
" See State v Thorne, 333 SE2d 817, 821 (W Va 1985) (Miller dissenting).
"0Aggravating circumstances might include such characteristics as anonymity, repetition, or the use of obscene language.
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Fourteenth Amendments by "chilling" protected communications,
since some callers would think twice before initiating calls that
might escalate into a heated exchange.
Some courts and legislatures address this concern by specifying that the caller must exhibit the "sole intent" to harass;"' others
restrict the scope of the statute less by requiring "initial intent"
-"when the telephone call was made.., the caller's intent [must
have been] to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass. '32 Where intentionally harassing anonymous calls are concerned, however, there is
no fear of chilling protected speech, and thus no need to require a
"sole," or "initial," intent provision. 3
C.

The Conduct-Speech Distinction

The Supreme Court has held that conduct containing expression may in some instances be restricted without violating the First
Amendment. 34 In addition, the Court has said that the function of
the overbreadth doctrine "attenuates as the otherwise unprotected
behavior it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech'
toward conduct."36 Thus, where a statute regulates conduct containing expression, courts may give less weight to the statute's
"chilling" effect.3"
31 See State v Brown, 274 SC 506, 266 SE2d 64, 65 (1980). See also Jones v Municipality of Anchorage, 754 P2d 275, 279 (Alaska App 1988). It may be that "sole intent" is constitutionally required. In subsection (D) of the federal telephone harassment statute, 47
USC § 223(a)(1) (cited in note 2), Congress required the sole intent to harass in "repeated
telephone calls, during which conversation ensues," but where no other aggravating factors
exist. Though subsections (A), (B), and (C) of the same statute do not contain the "sole
intent" requirement, subsections (A) and (B) apply to specific situations in which constitutional protections are generally considered to be at a minimum (i.e., obscene calls and intentionally threatening or harassing anonymous calls). And subsection (C) does not apply to
speech at all but to "causfing] the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring,
with intent to harass ...." Congress apparently intended that, absent aggravating factors,
the statute require a caller to have the exclusive purpose of harassing the recipient.
3 Elder, 382 S2d at 691 (emphasis added). See also Thorne, 333 SE2d at 824 (Miller
dissenting).

"

See note 85.

31"1It has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed." Cox v Louisiana, 379
US 536, 563 (1965)(citation omitted).
35Broadrick v Oklahoma, 413 US 601, 615 (1973).
3"Some courts have suggested that the conduct-speech distinction is irrelevant to the
due process concerns of the vagueness doctrine. People v Norman, 703 P2d 1261, 1267 (Colo
1985) (en banc). Others, however, have held that to the extent that a statute regulates conduct rather than speech, otherwise vague formulations may be permissible. See Hiett v
United States, 415 F2d 664, 672 (5th Cir 1969). See also Note, Vagueness Doctrine in the
Federal Courts, 26 Stan L Rev 855, 860 n 27 (1974) ("The more directly a statute is aimed
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Several courts have seized upon the conduct-speech distinction as a means of upholding telephone harassment statutes.3 7 For
instance, the Fourth Circuit recently relied on the conduct-speech
distinction to affirm a West Virginia Supreme Court decision upholding that state's telephone harassment statute against an overbreadth challenge.3 8 According to the pluralities in both courts,
"[p]rohibiting harassment is not prohibiting speech, because harassment is not protected speech. Harassment is not communica'39
tion, although it may take the form of speech.
This sort of judicial side-stepping is troubling. The courts may
be correct that harassing phone calls are not constitutionally-protected speech. But such a holding should not be reached by judicial fiat. As Chief Justice Miller said in his dissent in State v
Thorne, the cases upholding statutes on the basis that phone calls
are conduct "have a sophistry that [is] repugnant where, as here,
legitimate conversation ensues."4 0 To declare that a statute forbids
only conduct might be acceptable if conversation were not an element of the offense. But where, as in Thorne, conversation is required by the statute, the First Amendment cannot be ignored.4 1
In statutes focusing on actual verbal communication, conduct and
speech are not completely separable unless the category of perverse
conduct proscribed by the statute expressly excludes all forms of
protected communication.
D.

Vague Terminology
Given the nature of the regulated activity and the range of

at regulating first amendment related activity, the stricter the scrutiny should be.").
3 See Gormley, 632 F2d at 941-42; Baker v State, 16 Ariz App 463, 494 P2d 68, 70
(1972)("[The statute] is not directed at the communication of thoughts or ideas but at conduct, in other words, the use of the telephone to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy
or offend people by use of the language proscribed."); Elder, 382 S2d at 690. See also Gattis,
730 P2d at 502; People v Taravella, 133 Mich App 515, 350 NW2d 780, 783 (1984); Camp,
295 SE2d at 768; State v Jaeger, 249 NW2d 688, 691-92 (Iowa 1977); Donley v City of
Mountain Brook, 429 S2d 603, 607-08 (Ala Cr App 1982), rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte
Donley, 429 S2d 618 (Ala 1983); State v Crelly, 313 NW2d 455, 457 (SD 1981).
38 Thorne v Bailey, 846 F2d 241, 243-44 (4th Cir 1988)(affirming State v Thorne, 333
SE2d 817 (W Va 1985)).
3' Thorne v Bailey, 846 F2d at 243 (quoting State v Thorne, 333 SE2d at 819).
40 State v Thorne, 333 SE2d at 824 (Miller dissenting).
4'Thorne was convicted of violating W Va Code § 61-8-16(a)(4) (1984), which makes
conversation an element of the offense. See State v Thorne, 333 SE2d at 824 (Miller dissenting). See also Gormley, 632 F2d at 944 (Mansfield concurring) ("Labelling the statute as
one prohibiting 'conduct' does [nothing to] resolve th[e] constructional dilemma [because
i]n most cases the 'conduct' punished is the oral communication rather than the ringing of
the telephone bell.").
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behavior restricted, it is difficult to draft telephone harassment
statutes precisely. Furthermore, the courts have supplied no explanatory principle to aid legislators in drafting future statutes. Indeed, the challenge of drafting a precise statute has only been complicated by the fact that the same terms have been found vague by
some courts and sufficiently precise by others. The words and
phrases which are most often challenged as vague may be separated into two general categories: those that describe the offense in
terms of the caller's intended effect on the recipient (e.g., "harass,"
"alarm," and "intimidate"), and those that describe the offensive
content of the calls (e.g., "obscene," "profane," "vulgar," and
"indecent").
1. Terms describing effect on the recipient.
Virtually every term used to define the caller's intended effect
has been challenged as unconstitutionally vague.42 While in most
instances the statutes have been upheld, this is due largely to the
clarifying effects of other statutory elements or to the willingness
of courts to impose authoritative constructions of those terms; 3
the statutes' survival can hardly be attributed to the precision of
the terms themselves.
The courts disagree over the clarity of certain terms. For instance, they define the terms "annoy" and "alarm" in a variety of
ways. Likewise, while some courts find the common phrase "annoys or seriously alarms" unconstitutionally vague, others hold it
to be neither vague nor overbroad."' As with overbreadth, no one
principle explains the distinctions courts draw in applying the
vagueness doctrine. They simply announce that certain words-for
example, "harass"-are sufficiently clear, while other terms-for
4'2 Compare, for example, State v Sanderson, 33 Or App 173, 575 P2d 1025, 1027 (1978),

City of Everett v Moore, 37 Wash App 862, 683 P2d 617, 619 (1984), and Norman, 703 P2d

at 1266 (virtually identical statutes containing the phrase "alarms or seriously annoys" were
found void for vagueness); with Kinney v State, 404 NE2d 49, 51 (Ind App 1980) and Donley, 429 S2d at 611 (upholding two nearly identical'statutes because they particularized the
offense to include only telephone calls). See also People v McBurney, 750 P2d 916, 918
(Colo 1988) (en banc) (upholding use of the terms "alarm" and "annoy").
"' Courts often avoid applying the vagueness doctrine by narrowing the statute through
judicial construction. For instance, in upholding statutes several courts have applied "noscitur a sociis" (figuratively, "birds of a feather")-a rule of construction which provides that
"general and specific words, capable of analogous meaning, when associated together, take
color from each other, so that general words are restricted to a sense analogous to less general." State v Hertzog, 241 La 783, 131 S2d 788, 789 (1961). See also State v Meunier, 354
S2d 535, 537-38 (La 1978); People v Parkins, 77 Ill 2d 253, 396 NE2d 22, 24 (1979).
11 See cases cited in note 42.
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example, "annoy" or "alarm"-lack precision. Telephone harassment statutes by necessity contain some vague and broad terminology, but it is senseless for courts to employ formal distinctions
between such inherently imprecise terms as a way of delimiting
constitutional protections. Instead, courts (and preferably, in the
first instance, legislatures) must clearly define the statutory
terminology.
2.

Terms describing offensive content.

Words describing the offensive content of harassing
calls-adjectives such as "profane," "lewd," "lascivious," "vulgar,"
"coarse," and "offensive"-are also undeniably vague. Nonetheless,
courts at times uphold the use of these terms by relying on narrowing judicial constructions or on the clarifying effects of other statutory elements.4 5
Because of its peculiar legal meaning, the term "obscene"
poses interesting vagueness problems when used in telephone harassment statutes. In Baker v State, the court rejected a challenge
to the Arizona statute based in part on the indefiniteness of the
word "obscene."' 4 The Baker court made clear at the outset that
the statute was not an obscenity statute, and that it would be "inane" to apply constitutional standards of obscenity to determine
whether an obscene telephone call appeals to "prurient interests"
or whether such activity has any redeeming social value.47 Thus,
the court reasoned that the publication or display of "obscenity"
and the use of "obscene" language in the course of a harassing telephone call are distinct legal issues."
The Baker court's point is an important one. The law of obscenity punishes people for the very content of their offensive expressions. Telephone harassment statutes, on the other hand, punish intentional invasions of individual privacy. In telephone

15See Baker, 494 P2d at 70-71 (upholding "obscene" and "profane"); Hertzog, 131 S2d
at 790 (upholding "vulgar"); State v Koetting, 616 SW2d 822, 826 (Mo 1981) (en banc)
(upholding the phrase "coarse language offensive to one of average sensibility").
46 494 P2d at 70-71.
47 Id.
48 Id. Other authorities also make this distinction. See Jaeger, 249 NW2d at 691 (upholding the phrase "obscene, lewd or profane"); Crelly, 313 NW2d at 456 (upholding the
terms "obscene" and "lewd"). See also People v Weeks, 197 Colo 175, 591 P2d 91, 95 (1979)
(en banc). At least one statute has been invalidated precisely because it attempted to combine the two issues. See State v Ray, 302 Or 595, 733 P2d 28, 31 (1987) (holding vague a
statute that prohibited a person from subjecting "another to alarm or annoyance by telephonic use of obscenities.")
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harassment, the use of obscene language is merely a factor aggravating an independently proscribable offense.4"
II.

DEFINING THE SUBSTANTIVE LIMITS

The preceding section illustrates the often arbitrary manner in
which courts employ the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to
police governmental regulation of harassing phone calls. The two
doctrines generally are useful means of guarding constitutional
boundaries. One cannot methodically protect the parameters of a
right, however, without first defining the extent and nature of the
right and, by implication, its boundaries. But in the context of
telephone harassment statutes, courts attempt just that: they apply the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines without first engaging
in a substantive analysis of the parameters of "protected" speech.
This section answers the question that the courts have neglected
by defining the substantive limits which the First and Fourteenth
Amendments impose on the statutory restriction of harassing telephone calls.
A. Placing
Expression

Telephone

Harassment

in the

Field of Free

The regulation of telephone harassment, unlike other First
Amendment issues, evades a narrow classification. Anonymous, obscene, speechless, and threatening calls each present unique First
Amendment concerns. Only two characteristics are common to all
harassing calls: they are telephone calls, most often to residences,
and they are unwanted by or offensive to the recipient. Given these
characteristics, how can one defend the position taken by many
courts that "the Constitution will tolerate greater limits on the dialogue of a speaker" in the context of harassing telephone calls
than it will tolerate in other categories of expression?5" This section will illustrate that the privacy interest of the unwilling recipient most effectively distinguishes telephone harassment from
speech in other contexts.
The Supreme Court has shown "no lack of solicitude for the
right of an individual 'to be let alone' in the privacy of the
home." 51 Indeed, the Court has viewed "protecting the well-being,
49 This distinction has important implications for vagueness analysis. See text at notes
82-83.
50 State v Keaton, 371 S2d 86, 93 (Fla 1979) (emphasis added).
61 Carey v Brown, 447 US 455, 471 (1980).
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tranquility, and privacy of the home... [as a state interest] of the
highest order in a free and civilized society."5 While the law
presumes that each person bears the risk of encountering a certain
amount of objectionable expression in the public domain,5 3 the
home is a sanctuary. 54 As the Supreme Court has stated, "There
simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling
'55
listener.
Unwanted intrusions into the privacy of the home are the
most basic form of trespass. Before the telephone, intrusions on a
citizen's residential privacy were essentially physical invasions of
property. The telephone decouples privacy and property, making
invasions of privacy possible without physical invasion of property.5 6 Moreover, property lines have traditionally been respected
because of two potential costs associated with trespass: forcible resistance and legal liability. By nullifying forcible resistance as an
obstacle to privacy invasions, the telephone eliminates one of the
two deterrents to trespasses. Because many telephonic trespasses
are anonymous, one can prevent the intrusion on one's privacy
only by screening calls, delisting one's telephone number, or simply
not answering the phone. Thus, only the second of the two conventional bars on privacy intrusions remains: legal liability.
Like the telephone, radio and television are also media
through which expression is conveyed into the privacy of the home.
The Supreme Court has recognized limits on expression delivered
via the public airwaves because of the privacy interests involved.
In FCC v Pacifica Foundation,the Supreme Court found that the
"uniquely pervasive" nature of the broadcast media permitted restrictions on expression that would be unconstitutional in other,
more public contexts: "[I]n the privacy of the home ... the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amend-

52

11

Id.

See Cohen v California,403 US 15, 21 (1971); Erznoznik v Jacksonville, 422 US 205,
209-10 (1975).
14 As the Supreme Court recently explained, "[a] special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to
avoid intrusions." Frisby v Schultz, 108 S Ct 2495, 2502 (1988).
55 Id at 2502. See also Rowan v United States Post Office Dept., 397 US 728, 737
(1970); FCC v Pacifica Foundation,438 US 726, 748 (1978); Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77,
86-87 (1949).
56 Interestingly, intrusions by telephone were the catalyst for the Supreme Court's
abandonment of physical, property-based limits on trespass by the government in Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases. See Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 350-53
(1967)(the Court shifted the inquiry from whether property lines were actually penetrated
by the search to whether reasonable expectations of privacy were violated).
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ment rights of an intruder. ' 57 According to the Pacifica Court,
"[t]o say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy
for an assault is to run away after the first blow."5 8 The Court also
noted the analogy to harassing telephone calls: "One may hang up
on an indecent phone call, but that option does not give the caller
a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken
place." 59 Just as the listener or viewer usually has no notice of
what he will encounter when he tunes into a radio or television
broadcast, the recipient of a telephone call seldom knows what will
confront him when he picks up the receiver.
A person's inability to avoid offensive communicative intrusions is an important concern in First Amendment doctrine. When
the audience is a "captive" one, the First Amendment allows the
State to "'recognize degrees of evil and adapt its legislation accordingly.' "0 In Frisby v Schultz, the Supreme Court upheld a
residential anti-picketing ordinance in part because "resident[s
were] figuratively, and perhaps literally, trapped within the[ir]
home[s], and . . . left with no ready means of avoiding the unwanted speech."' Likewise, in Kovacs v Cooper, the Court upheld
an ordinance restricting the public use of sound trucks and amplifiers, finding that "[t]he unwilling listener... [i]n his home.., 's2
is
'
practically helpless to escape this interference with his privacy.
57 438

US at 748.

51Id at 748-49.
59 Id at 749.
8o Lehman v Shaker Heights, 418 US 298, 302 (1974)(plurality opinion)(quoting Packer
Corp. v Utah, 285 US 105, 110 (1932)).
81

108 S Ct at 2503-04.

336 US 77, 86-87 (1949).
Not all expressive intrusions on residential privacy, however, have been found unprotected. For instance, in Bolger v Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 US 60 (1983), the Supreme Court observed that recipients of objectionable mailings could avoid the intrusion by
making the "short, though regular, journey from mailbox to trashcan." Id at 72 (quoting
Lamont v Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F Supp 880, 883 (S D NY 1967)). The
question in the Court's view was not whether the recipient was "captive," but whether the
burden of avoidance was an "acceptable" one. In Bolger, the Court believed it was. 463 US
at 72-73.
The intrusion on the recipient's privacy caused by offensive mailings, however, is minimal compared with the encroachment on the sanctity of the home caused by harassing telephone calls. Harassing telephone calls are intensely personal invasions. The recipient of a
harassing call is not like a person in a crowd who when exposed to an offensive slogan can
merely "avert his eyes" to avoid the intrusion. See Cohen, 403 US at 21. Nor is he like the
recipient of unwanted mail, whose privacy interest is violated only by the offending statements themselves. The caller's message is "directed at the person of the hearer," Cantwell u
Connecticut, 310 US 296, 309 (1940), who, if even for a few moments, is helpless to escape.
Thus the recipient of a harassing call is confronted by the person making the statements, in
82
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In order to foster uninhibited public discourse, the First
Amendment doctrine places the external costs of offensive expression made in most public forums on the public. The harm is diffuse
and avoidable, and the speaker's freedom near absolute, since he
need not self-censor his ideas to exclude offensive subject matter.
When a speaker uses the telephone to impose offensive views on an
unwilling recipient in his home, however, the harm is particularized, nearly unavoidable, and analogous to conduct giving rise to
the common law tort of trespass;6" in such circumstances, society
has an interest in imposing on the speaker some, or all, of the costs
of his expression.
B. The Cohen Standard
To show that expression invasive of individual privacy may
constitutionally be regulated goes only part of the way toward providing guidance for the regulation of harassing phone calls; a principle for determining when and to what extent the state may restrict such calls is still needed. Such a principle emerges in Cohen
6
v California.
In Cohen, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a
draft protester under a statute prohibiting willful disturbances of
the peace. The protestor entered a California courthouse wearing a
jacket displaying the words "Fuck the Draft." Given the uniquely
public context of Cohen's distateful mode of expression, the Court
rejected the argument that it was thrust upon unwilling or unsuspecting viewers who were unable to avoid exposure to the crude
form of protest."' The Court, in distinguishing the context of Cohen's speech from more private settings, stated that the "government may properly act in many situations to prohibit intrusion
into the privacy of the home of unwelcome views and ideas which
cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue."66 The Court
then articulated the parameters of the government's authority to
regulate unwelcomed offensive expression: "The ability of the govaddition to being unwillingly exposed to the statements themselves.
ft Harassing telephone calls resemble actual trespasses more than harassing door-todoor solicitations do. A ringing telephone beckons to be answered, though the identity of the
caller is seldom known in advance. As soon as the receiver is lifted off the hook, the trespass
begins. The caller and his unwanted message have entered the privacy of the home. By
contrast, when an unwanted solicitor comes to the door, the resident, after learning the
identity of the visitor, can choose whether or not to admit him.
403 US 15 (1971).
65 Id at 21.
66 Id.
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ernment, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse
solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a
showing that substantialprivacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner. 'a7 This statement provides a useful standard for drafting and evaluating telephone harassment

statutes.
C.

Intolerability of Communicative Invasions

The Cohen "intolerability" standard as applied to telephone
harassment statutes would require that such regulations be limited
in application to intolerable intrusions of substantialprivacy interests. This standard can define the basic substantive limits
placed on the regulation of telephone harassment by the First
Amendment. To give legislators clear guidance, courts must interpret "intolerability" objectively. The analysis would thus focus on
the following question: Given the nature of the offensive calls and
the nature of the privacy interests of the recipient, are the calls
something society can and should endure for the cause of free
68
expression?
The "intolerability" standard is not a precise formula. Like
most constitutional tests, it merely identifies the relevant concerns
bearing on the substantive analysis. Its primary value is in addressing the substantive issues of telephone harassment, and
thereby giving better guidance to legislators than the current ad
hoc and unprincipled jurisprudence. The intolerability standard
also answers both overbreadth and vagueness questions. By employing an objective "intolerability" standard, a court can more
easily interpret a statute's reach. Any statute defined in reference
to such a standard will, by definition, be sufficiently clear to constitutionally guide conduct.
The most important factors bearing on the "intolerability" of
a call include: (1) whether the caller had a culpable intent when he
initiated the call, or whether such an intent developed during the
conversation; (2) whether the caller identified himself; (3) whether
the caller made repeated calls, and whether the recipient or some17

Id (emphasis added).

To base the intolerability inquiry on the forbearance of a particularrecipient would
leave potential offenders to estimate the subjective sensitivity of the recipient. Such a requirement would be unconstitutionally vague, "not in the sense that it requires a person to
conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in
the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Coates v City of Cincinnati, 402
US 611, 614 (1971).
"
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one at the called number had previously instructed the caller not
to call again; (4) whether actual words were spoken by the caller,
and whether such words were of an obscene, lewd, or indecent nature; and (5) whether because of a preexisting relationship between
the caller and the person receiving the call, the privacy interests of
the recipient were not, in fact, "substantial."
D. Substantiality of Privacy Interests
As illustrated above, governmental protection of residential
and other similar privacy interests is the primary justification for
telephone harassment regulation. Even when the unwilling listener
is reached in the "privacy of the home," however, this does not
"automatically . . .justify curtailing all speech capable of giving

offense." 69 Rather, a "substantial" privacy interest must be at
stake.
When an individual receives an intentionally harassing communication in his household, this substantiality requirement would
normally be met. But in some limited instances, individual privacy
interests may not be so "substantial" as to warrant government
intervention. Telephone harassment regulations reach far beyond
the paradigm of the unknown offensive caller into the realm of
communications between family members, intimates, friends, and
associates. The "substantiality" of the recipient's privacy interests
will vary dramatically in these situations, and consequently regulation of telephone harassment should be curtailed if a preexisting
"intimate" relationship significantly reduces the privacy interests
of the recipient vis-A-vis the particular caller.70
The necessity and desirability of an intimate relationship exception to telephone harassment regulation stem from two common sense observations. First, intimate relationships by definition
involve voluntary relinquishment of a substantial measure of indi" Cohen, 403

US at 21.

7o A narrow category of "intimate relationships" might presumptively include spouses,
unmarried cohabitants, and intimate friends and relatives, qualified by the requirement that
the caller reasonably have believed the recipient would consent both to the manner of the
communication and the language used.
The category of intimate relationships arises in other areas of the law. Regarding its
application to evidentiary privileges, see Developments in the Law-Privileged Communi-

cations, 98 Harv L Rev 1450, 1590 (1985). See generally Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 Phil & Pub Aff 26, 33-34 (1976); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom
of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L J 624, 634 (1980). See also Mary I. Coombs, Shared
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 Cal L Rev 1593
(1987), arguing for an expanded conception of intimate relationships for the purposes of
determining who may challenge searches under the Fourth Amendment.

1420

The University of Chicago Law Review

[56:1403

vidual privacy.71 Because the participants in intimate relationships
depreciate the "substantiality" of their privacy interests, the government's justification for intervening to protect the recipient from
unwanted intrusions is diminished as well. Second, in calls between
intimate persons the culpability of the caller may be lessened, if
not eliminated. People presume a greater latitude of expression
with intimates than with strangers or mere acquaintances, and
there will be instances in which a party has placed an otherwise
offensive call on the reasonable belief that in the course of a relationship the recipient has conferred a sort of implied consent to
such speech.7 2
Nonetheless, just as intimate relationships involve, within
themselves, a relinquishment of privacy that lessens the government's interest in intervention, those same relationships, when
gone sour, can become the greatest source of harassing phone calls.
What is needed to protect the individual's privacy in such cases is
a "notice remedy"-a statutory remedy on behalf of the recipient
to instruct any harassing caller that he is not to call again, after
which subsequent unsolicited calls would be forbidden. As the Supreme Court recognized in Rowan v United States Post Office Department,3 when it held that a citizen may notify the post office
not to deliver offensive mail from a particular sender, an individual's privacy rights within the home are most substantial when he
has expressed his desire not to receive further communications
from a particular source. State enforcement of a citizen's decision
to shut off communication from a particular source is not the same
as state censorship of that communication. The right to notify the
post office not to deliver mail from a particular sender, upheld in
Rowan, and the right protected by a proposed "notice remedy" are
71

The Supreme Court has defined intimate relationships in a way consistent with this

thesis. See Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 619-20 (1984).
'2 The paradigmatic case between intimates might cast the male as the caller and the
female as the recipient. Thus, one might argue that this Comment favors the rights of men
over women, i.e., "It is men's right to inflict [harassment] upon women in private that is
protected." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law
155 (Harvard, 1987) (concerning pornography). But this is simply not the case. First, the
exception is not based on relational privacy but rather the voluntary relinquishment of individual privacy to another. Secondly, the intimate relationships exception is limited to less
aggravated forms of harassment and its effects would be moderated by the recipient's selfexecutable "notice remedy." See text at notes 73-75. So limited, the exception only gives the
caller the "right" to make one harassing call. This is by no means unusual; a number of
statutes have been drafted to allow a one-call "free shot." See Model Penal Code and Commentaries: Official Draft and Revised Comments § 250.4 at 361-63 (American Law Institute,

1980).
73 397 US 728 (1970).
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essentially the same: that of the citizen, not the State, to choose
which communications will enter the privacy of his home. 4
This "notice remedy" finds support in the Supreme Court's
view that citizens have an absolute right to control the information, thoughts, and ideas that enter their homes. When exercised
by the individual recipient, the notice remedy would supersede the
intimate relationships exception, allowing the recipient to reerect
privacy barriers presumed dismantled by the exception. As was
true in Rowan, the wall of privacy erected by the notice remedy
would be absolute-when put on notice, "no one [would have] a
right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient. 7 5 However, the value of the notice remedy extends beyond the moderating effect it would have on the intimate relationships exception.
The notice remedy provides all citizens with a self-executable
method for avoiding repeated unwanted calls, irrespective of the
nature of the call.
E. The Need for Precision
Criminal statutes restricting First Amendment liberties must
be narrow and specific7 6 because of the potential for chilling protected expression. Nonetheless, if the Fourteenth Amendment
were thought to require absolute precision, it would be impossible
to legislate against telephone harassment and similar offenses.77
The basic function of the vagueness doctrine is to ensure that statutory language is sufficiently definite to give notice of what is pro" Rowan is distinguishable from telephone harassment on two counts: (1) Rowan concerned arguably less intrusive communications by mail, and (2) Rowan involved traditionally less protected commercial speech. But neither of these differences weakens the inference that, as in the case of unwanted mail, a citizen should have a right to control unwanted
telephone calls. If anything, these differences suggest that the citizen has a greater right to
control unwanted telephone communications.
Compare Rowan with Martin v City of Struthers, 319 US 141 (1943), and Bolger, 463
US 60 (1983). In Martin,the Court invalidated a complete ban on door-to-door solicitations.
The Court reasoned that while the ban would impermissibly intrude on expressive rights,
the government could "make it an offense for any person to ring the bell of a householder
who ha[d] appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to be disturbed." Martin, 319 US at
148. In Bolger, the Court invalidated a federal statute which prohibited the unsolicited
mailing of advertisements for contraceptives. Discussing Rowan, the Bolger Court stated:
"We have, of course, recognized the important interest in allowing addressees to give notice
to a mailer that they wish no further mailings ....But we have never held that the Government itself can shut off the flow of mailings to protect those recipients who might potentially be offended." Bolger, 463 US at 72.
75 397 US at 738.
76 See NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 438 (1963).
7
See United States v Petrillo, 332 US 1, 7-8 (1947).
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scribed to citizens and guidance to courts."' Given these concerns,
courts should ask two questions when evaluating vagueness challenges to telephone harassment statutes: first, is the vagueness
avoidable; and second, in light of the narrowing elements of the
statute, does the vagueness in the terminology pose serious due
process concerns? If the answer to both questions is "no," there is
no constitutional vagueness problem. Even if the vagueness is
avoidable, there is no constitutional reason to invalidate the statute; courts should simply construe such statutes narrowly to clarify
this vagueness. Only if the statute, when narrowly construed, still
poses a serious possibility of confusion should the statute be
voided for vagueness.
The inherently vague nature of the terminology used in telephone harassment statutes has caused problems as the courts have
attempted to draw fine distinctions between terms as similar as
"harass" and "annoy," or "obscene" and "profane. 7 9 With the
first two terms, the imprecision can be avoided. The latter two
terms are more problematic.
Terms like "harass" and "annoy" are used in telephone harassment statutes to describe the intent of the caller. They are
meant to ensure that only calls made for the purpose of causing
discomfort or distress to their recipients are prohibited. Thus,
though the terms are frequently challenged as vague and overbroad because they may be interpreted to reach constitutionallyprotected expression, both vagueness and overbreadth problems
can be avoided if the two terms are defined to encompass only "behavior intended to cause psychic or emotional distress to the recipient of the call." 0

8 See People v Taravella, 313 Mich App 515, 350 NW2d 780, 784 (1984); Bachowski v
Salamone, 39 Wis 2d 397, 407 NW2d 533, 537 (1987).
79 See note 25.
8 The Model Penal Code § 250.4(1) (cited in note 72) provides: "a person commits
[harassment when], with purpose to harass another, he... makes a telephone call without
purpose of legitimate communication." The drafters believed that in terms of statutory precision "it is probably impossible to do any better." MPC § 250.4(1), comment at 371. This
conclusion is dubious. First, the term "harass" can be narrowed to provide greater administrability while at the same time satisfying both the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.
When a statute, or portion thereof, is limited to speech having "no legitimate purpose," it
cannot be applied to calls during which the caller even momentarily possessed a legitimate
intent. But it is not unconstitutional to punish a caller for the harassing portion of a call
which also contained legitimate conversation, so long as the effect of punishing such calls is
not to chill protected speech. By defining the operative term "harass" to encompass only
intentional inflictions of psychic or emotional distress, it should be clear that when a caller
had the "intent to harass" he did not intend "legitimate" communication. Second, the
clause "without purpose of legitimate communication" does little to clarify the statute.
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Unlike terms describing intent, terms used to describe the offensive content of harassing telephone calls cannot be easily defined to avoid indefiniteness. Arguments about whether "obscene"
is more definite than "profane," or "lewd" more lucid than "lascivious," are purely academic. As a practical matter all such terms are
vague, perhaps unavoidably so. Attempts to define these terms
narrowly are therefore futile. 1
Although courts sometimes define obscenity narrowly in other
contexts to protect the due process rights of potential offenders, 2
as argued above,8 3 statutory obscenity and obscene language as an
element of telephone harassment are quite distinct. Telephone
harassment statutes punish people for intentionally and maliciously invading individual privacy, not for mouthing obscenities.
A caller who uses obscene language during a call which he initiated, but not for the intended purpose of harassing the recipient,
would not be culpable under this Comment's definition, regardless
of the subjective effect on the listener. Because the caller's obscene
or offensive speech only colors what is in itself a prohibitable act,
the due process concerns surrounding the specificity of the relevant terminology are minimized, making some degree of statutory
vagueness permissible.

III. A

MODEL STATUTE

This final section proposes a model telephone harassment statute that criminalizes only telephone calls in which the caller subjects the recipient to an intolerable intrusion of substantial privacy
interests. This formulation attempts to reconcile the constitutional
theory underlying state restriction of harassing telephone calls
with the application of the law in specific cases. Because the state's

"Such a 'limiting construction' disguises the constitutional difficulties of the statute but
does nothing to resolve them. A judge or a jury still has to determine whether the particular
speech of the defendant was 'for a legitimate purpose.'" Bolles v People, 189 Colo 394, 541
P2d 80, 83 (1975) (en banc). Rather than requiring "no legitimate purpose," a statute could
more properly create a residual offense that would forbid all calls made with the sole and
exclusive purpose to harass. The effect of such a provision is the same, but this formulation
avoids the vagueness inherent in defining an offense in terms of the legitimacy of the
speech.
11 See Ray, 733 P2d at 28-29. Also see model statute proposed in Comment, A Remedial Approach to Harassment, 70 Va L Rev 507, 527-28 (1984).
82 See Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 571-72 (1942) (defining "obscenity"
as part of a class of utterances which "are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality").
83 See text at notes 46-49.
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authority to regulate in this area derives from the interest in protecting individuals who are unable to avoid intrusions on their personal, residential privacy, the statute provides a mechanism for
limiting regulation in intimate relational settings where diminished
privacy interests may not warrant government intervention. Furthermore, the statute recognizes that limits placed on state regulation by the First Amendment are inapposite where the citizen, not
the government, is the agent acting to suppress certain communications. On this basis, the statute provides a self-executable "notice remedy" to citizens who desire not to receive further communications from a particular caller.
A. Proposed Model Statute
The proposed statute provides:
(1) It shall be unlawful for a person:
(a) To make a telephone call with the sole intent to harass the recipient of the call; or
(b) To make a telephone call, with the intent to harass
the recipient of the call, without disclosing one's identity;
or
(c) To make a telephone call to a non-consenting recipient, with the intent to harass, using obscene language; or
(d) To make repeated telephone calls to a non-consenting
recipient, with the intent to harass, during which conversation ensues; or
(e) To make a telephone call when the recipient of the
call or other person at the called number has previously
instructed the caller not to call again.
(2) Definitions:
(a) This statute applies only to unsolicited calls made to
persons at their private residences or other similar locations where they would reasonably expect a substantial
degree of privacy;
(b) Under subsections (1)(c) and (d) the "intent to harass" required by the statute must exist at the time the
call was initiated;
(c) The phrase "intent to harass" encompasses any behavior intended to cause psychic or emotional distress to
the recipient of the call;
(d) The phrase "sole intent to harass" means (i) that the
call must have been made with the exclusive purpose of
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harassment, and (ii) that this purpose must have remained exclusive for the duration of the call;
(e) The phrase "make a telephone call" means to intentionally dial the phone and allow the telephone to ring,
and includes (i) instances where the caller requests a return call from the recipient and upon receipt of the return call commences to engage in behavior prohibited by
the statute, (ii) operator-assisted calls, and (iii) calls
made by mechanical, electronic, or computer devices
under human control;
(f) The term "non-consenting recipient" does not include
those persons involved in intimate personal relationships
with the caller, unless it may be shown that under the
circumstances prevailing at the time the call was initiated
the caller could not have reasonably believed that the recipient would consent to the manner of the call or the
language used. "Intimate personal relationships" includes
relationships between spouses, unmarried cohabitants,
and intimate friends or relatives;
(g) The term "repeated telephone calls" means more than
one call in close enough proximity to rightly be termed a
single episode. Under subsection (1)(d) of the statute the
calls need not be made to the same recipient.
B. Application and Evaluation
The proposed statute operates within the parameters of the
Cohen "intolerability" standard, which can define the substantive
limits placed on telephone harassment regulation by the First
Amendment. The following analysis shows that the proposed statute does not exceed these constitutional limits, and offers a
method that courts recognizing the intolerability standard can follow in adjudicating overbreadth and vagueness challenges.
1. Subsection (1)(a): Calls made with the sole intent to
harass.
This subsection of the statute is aimed at calls made with no
legitimate purpose whatsoever. Telephone calls made with the sole
intent to harass merit no constitutional protection when "harass"
is defined, as here, to mean "behavior which causes psychic or
emotional distress to the recipient of the call." Because there is no
intent to communicate ideas between persons, the First Amendment simply does not apply.
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Under subsection (1)(a) it is not enough that the caller possessed the intent to harass when he initiated the call. As defined in
subsection (2)(d), "sole intent" means: first, that the call must
have been made with the exclusive purpose of harassment; and
second, that purpose must have persisted for the duration of the
call. The apparent difficulty of proving "sole intent" will serve to
constrain prosecutions under this subsection. Where "sole intent"
may be shown, however, this subsection prohibits calls that might
otherwise fall within another subsection of the statute because of
anonymity, obscenity, or repetition. Unlike subsections (1)(c) and
(d), this subsection extends no particularized protection to callers
in cases of intimate relationships. However, prosecution under this
subsection seems unlikely where the caller and the recipient have a
prior relationship that renders more plausible a supposed legitimate purpose in calling. e4 Finally, note that subsection (1)(a),
when read in conjunction with subsection (2)(e)-which states that
the act of making a telephone call is complete once the number is
dialed and the phone is allowed to ring-may be violated regardless of whether the caller speaks, or even whether the recipient
answers.
2.

Subsection (1)(b): Anonymous calls.

This subsection of the statute focuses specifically on intentionally harassing anonymous calls. The courts generally agree that
anonymous calls do not merit much First Amendment protection
from state restriction. 5 Read in conjunction with subsection (2)(e),
the statute prohibits anonymous calls even where no actual conversation ensues, the telephone is allowed to ring continuously unan8, A similar observation has been made regarding a section of the federal telephone
harassment statute, 47 USC § 223(a)(1)(D) (cited in note 2), which provides: "[it shall be
unlawful] by means of telephone [to] make[] repeated telephone calls, during which conversation ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number." (Emphasis added). In
United States v Darsey, 342 F Supp 311, 313-14 (E D Pa 1972), the court noted: "[M]any
situations, and most especially in romantic and family conflicts,.. . are and should be below
the cognizance of the law. This Court does not read this section of the law to extend to these
situations, no matter how much sympathy it might have for one side or the other in such a
conflict, unless some completely unjustifiable motive, such as revenge or cruelty, motivates
such repeated contacts.., between those known to each other. Only then can such calls be
properly called 'solely to harass.'" (Emphasis added).
15 See note 18. While most anonymous calls have no redeeming value, an anonymous
call may contain entirely legitimate communications. Consider the example of a
"whistleblower" who anonymously reports information to a government official or the media. Nonetheless, where anonymity is combined with intent to harass, such calls are
intolerable.
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swered, or a call is placed and the caller deliberately refuses to
hang up.
Note that, unlike subsections (1)(c) and (d), the culpable intent here need not be the motivating purpose of the call. This subsection only requires that the caller possess the intent to harass at
some point during the call. We are not, after all, bothered by the
prospect of a chilling effect on paradigm anonymous telephone
calls-"virtually any willfully bad motive in making an anonymous
phone call should be punishable." 8
3. Subsection (1)(c): Calls involving the use of obscene
language.
This subsection prohibits the use of obscene language in intentionally harassing calls where the recipient does not actually or implicitly consent to the manner of the call or to the language used.
The term "obscene" is not defined by the statute, but should be
understood as joining the common meaning of the term8 with the
statute's definition of the term "harass"-"behavior which causes
psychic or emotional distress to the recipient of the call."
The bar on intentionally harassing obscene calls is limited by
subsection (2)(f), which in effect creates a presumption that persons involved in intimate personal relationships with the caller are
consenting recipients. The presumption fails, however, if it is
shown that at the time the call was placed, circumstances prevailed
which would have made it unreasonable for the caller to have believed the recipient would consent to the manner of the call or the
language used.8 8 At first glance, the application of such a presumption to obscene calls may appear extreme, but in fact it is a reasonable accommodation of the diminished privacy interests encountered in intimate relationships.8 9
11 Darsey, 342 F Supp at 313.
87 For instance, Webster's Dictionary defines "obscene" as "grossly repugnant to the
generally accepted notions of what is appropriate." Webster's Third World Dictionary(unabridged) at 1557 (cited in note 25).
" Under this section of the statute, recipients are presumed to be unwilling unless the
caller can persuade the court that an intimate relationship exists. Once this burden of persuasion is met, the recipient will then be presumed to have consented to the call unless he
can defeat the presumption of consent. This would be done by (1) proving that there was in
fact no such relationship, or (2) proving that the circumstances surrounding the relationship
were not such that the caller could have reasonably believed that the recipient would consent to the call.
19 The proposed statute may be subject to criticism for being overprotective of intentionally harassing callers because it does not prohibit single calls made with intent to harass
where no other aggravating factors exist. This is the result of a conscious decision not to
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The intimate-relationship exception applies only to subsections (1)(c) and (d); other types of calls are considered so intolerable that no prior relationship would eradicate the recipient's privacy expectations. The exception is strictly circumscribed. It
applies only to isolated calls between intimates and even then only
under circumstances where it would be reasonable for the caller to
presume consent by the recipient. This exception, of course, may
be defeated at any time by the recipient's communication to the
caller that such calls are not welcome.90
Calls involving the caller's use of obscene language thus present a difficult case under the intolerability analysis. In subsections
(1)(a) and (b), it is not necessary to consider the nature of the privacy interests in order to justify state restriction because the total
absence of communicative intent (i.e., where "sole intent" is required) or the implied absence of communicative substance (i.e.,
prohibiting intentionally harassing anonymous calls) are enough to
render such calls intolerable. In relation to calls involving obscene
language, however, the level of intolerability may vary considerably
depending on the relationship between the caller and the recipient.
Although some courts, including the Supreme Court, have assumed that all forms of obscenity are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality,"'" the
state may "not proscribe obscene telephone communications regardless of the circumstances." '9 2 The context in which the obscenity is uttered must be taken into account in determining what is
"intolerable," because the term "obscenity" evades precise definition." Indeed, "nowadays, obscene, lewd or profane language is not
uncommonly used between individuals without any intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy, or offend. '94 Even in the
context of intentionally harassing telephone calls, it is not clear
that the use of obscene language makes such calls intolerable in all
circumstances.
Subsection (2)(f) by no means immunizes from prosecution all

unduly restrict robust conversation by telephone. Allowing a one-call "free shot" is by no
means extraordinary. See note 72.
10 See discussion of subsection (1)(e) below.

"'

Chaplinsky, 315 US at 572. See also Cohen, 403 US at 24-25.

" Keaton, 371 S2d at 92.

"I See Jacobellis v Ohio, 378 US 184, 187 (1964) (a "dim and uncertain" line separates
obscenity from constitutionally protected expression).
Baker, 494 P2d at 72.
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intentionally harassing calls made between intimate persons.9 5 The
recipient may defeat the presumption of consent by proving that
the caller's presumption was objectively unreasonable. In addition,
even where this burden is not or cannot be met, the recipient may
seek remedy through other sections of the statute. Finally, the recipient himself may terminate the presumption created by the relationship by so notifying the caller. When considered in conjunction with these other remedies, the intimate-relationship exception
to subsection (1)(c) serves only to protect open and uninhibited
communication.
The very essence of obscenity revolves around issues of privacy. To the extent that obscenity is subject to restriction, it is
because it forces upon the public consciousness ideas, thoughts, or
images that are considered purely for private consumption.9
Where words conjuring up such thoroughly private ideas are conveyed between persons who share intimate privacy, the government's interest is less compelling given the pervasive chilling effect
that regulation of such calls would create. 7
Obscene language used in harassing telephone calls is not per
se unprotected under the proposed statute. Obscenity may be used
in harassing calls to assault the recipient in an indecent and intolerable manner: such behavior is unprotected. Language falling
under the broad rubric of obscenity may, however, be used between intimates as a way of expressing anger, frustration, or even
more benign sentiments. Such calls made between intimates are
not easily classified as "unreasonable conduct which, by its very
nature, erodes the peace of mind and solitude of an unsuspecting
individual,"9 8 and a statute reaching these cases would be
overbroad. 9

" The intimate relationship exception actually provides greater protection for recipients than do existing laws. Under prevailing statutory frameworks, callers are given substantial protection through prosecutorial discretion. Where an intimate relationship exists, the
chances that criminal action will be initiated are slight. The proposed statute, by codifying
the limits on prosecuting callers in such relationships, largely removes the issue of
prosecutorial discretion.
" See Pacifica, 438 US at 746 n 23.
97

"[Tlhe constitutional protection accorded to a communication containing patently

offensive sexual and excretory language need not be the same in every context." Id at 729.
" State v Crelly, 313 NW2d 455, 457 (SD 1981).
Consider, for instance, State v Keaton, 371 S2d 86 (Fla 1979), where a section of the

Florida statute (Fla Stat § 365.16 (1977)), patterned after the federal statute, was found
unconstitutionally overbroad. The court in Keaton found that "[jiust as the first amendment freedom of speech protects the right of an individual to possess obscene material in his
home [see Stanley v Georgia, 394 US 557 (1969)], this freedom also prohibits the punish-

ment of the mere use of obscene language in a telephone communication." 371 S2d at 91. As
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Some statutes are framed broadly, treating all obscene language as unprotected, leaving the courts to construe the statute so
as not to reach these cases.' Other statutes are framed more narrowly, requiring specific intent and narrowly defining the scope of
obscenity covered by the statute. 101 The proposed statute takes an
intermediate approach. Under this statute, obscene language is
merely an aggravating factor in a harassing call. While the statute
does not prohibit single calls made with intent to harass, an exception is made if obscene language is used in a call to a "non-consenting recipient."
4. Subsection (1)(d): Repeated calls.
This subsection is directed at non-obscene, non-anonymous repeated harassing calls. The caller need not use harassing speech at
all; it is enough that he initiated successive calls with the intent to
harass. Prohibitions of this sort, if not narrowly limited, could
reach protected communications. To avoid potential overbreadth,
this subsection, when read in conjunction with subsection (2)(b),
requires that the intent to harass be the purpose initially motivating the call. 02
the court also noted, it is "the privacy interests of the listener [I which constitutionally
entitle the state to protect him from unwilling subjection to verbal abuse." Id at 92. Thus, in
cases of intimate relationships, where the recipient's privacy interests vis-A-vis the caller are
reduced, the State's regulatory interest is less compelling.
10 The federal statute, 47 USC § 223(a)(1)(A), making it a criminal offense to "by
means of telephone ... make any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent," fits this description-it "was drawn broadly to
prevent technical escape by the guilty." Darsey, 342 F Supp at 312. This section of the
statute is identical to the section found overbroad in Keaton, 371 S2d 86. Both statutes
seem clearly overbroad. They contain no specific intent requirement. Any call containing
such a comment or suggestion, regardless of whether legitimate communication was intended or conveyed, would be subject to prosecution. Nor is the statute limited in its application to intimate relationships. Nevertheless, the federal statute was upheld in Darsey,
where the court interpreted subsection (A), in light of its legislative history, as not intended
"to make criminal the use of ungenteel or vulgar language sometimes called 'obscene' in the
course of an interstate telephone conversation, either from habit, anger or slanderous intent." 342 F Supp at 312. The court in Darsey also interpreted the statute as not reaching
"romantic and family conflicts," which the court believed were "below the cognizance of the
law." Id at 314.
'01 See note 81.
102 To violate this subsection the offender must engage in conversation. But subsection
(2)(e) defines the phrase "make a telephone call" to include operator-assisted calls. This
suggests that in such instances the operator becomes a constructive agent for the caller.
Thus, the subsection may be violated even where the caller utters no words so long as the
operator engages in some form of communication with the person receiving the call. See
Lampley, 573 F2d at 787-88, where this issue was litigated. As discussed above, sole intent
to harass is an aggravating factor which virtually eliminates the overbreadth concern.
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The repetition of harassing calls is an aggravating factor that
makes such calls more intolerable. Prudence may justify a handsoff policy for single calls made with the intent to harass, but as
harassing calls are repeated the state interest in intervening to protect the recipient becomes more compelling. Citizens should not be
left without remedy when a caller engages in a series of harassing
calls. This subsection also recognizes that the repetition itself,
without other aggravating factors, is not so intolerable as to overcome potential overbreadth problems inherent in application to intimate persons10° If harassing, but unaggravated, calls made between intimate persons are not normally subject to regulation, it is
not clear that such calls should be any more subject to regulation
when repeated. If the caller has a reasonable belief that the recipient will consent to the manner and content of his communication,
there should be no limit to the number of calls he can make. Of
course, where the recipient demonstrates his displeasure or disgust
in the previous call, the caller's belief that the recipient will consent to subsequent calls of a similar nature becomes less
convincing.
5.

Subsection (1)(e): Calls repeated after notice.

This subsection prohibits repeated calls, regardless of intent,
where the caller has previously been instructed not to call again. It
arms recipients with a self-executable "notice remedy." Anyone
who upon receiving a harassing call-or for that matter, any
call-decides he does not want to receive a subsequent call from
that particular caller may instruct the caller not to call again, after
which any subsequent call would be prohibited.
The justification for subsection (1)(e) follows from the substantiality of the privacy interests placed at issue when a recipient
unequivocally states a desire not to receive further calls. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Rowan recognized the right of
citizens to protect themselves from unwanted communications into
the household by erecting privacy barriers that cannot legally be
penetrated without the householder's acquiescence.1 04 Thus, where
a citizen gives notice to someone who desires to communicate an
unwanted message by telephone, the privacy interests of the citizen vis-A-vis the particular caller are at their highest. Because a
"' See

47 USC § 223(a)(1)(D), in which Congress required the caller to have a sole

intent to harass in repeated calls where conversation ensues. As discussed above, sole intent
to harass is an aggravating factor which virtually eliminates the overbreadth concern.
104 See discussion of Rowan in text at notes 73-75.
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caller has no constitutional right to communicate by phone to the
prior recipient after having received such an instruction, offenses
under this subsection of the statute do not require any form of
specific intent.
CONCLUSION

Restricting telephone harassment is an especially difficult legislative undertaking. The conscientious legislator is caught in a
whirlwind of competing rights and immunities. The legislator
rightly hesitates before proscribing a citizen's expression-a liberty
essential to the free flow of ideas and the stability of relationships
in our society. But he is nevertheless compelled to protect the right
of the same citizens peacefully to enjoy the solemn confines of
their private dwellings. The legislator thus reaches a compromise-he will forbid only those intrusions that, because of hostile
intent or offensive content, cannot be thought to further societal
interests. He knows that if he strikes an improper balance between
speech and privacy those more astute in the law will correct his
error. In time the courts do speak, but their message is brief:
"Void-try again."
This Comment attempts to ease the legislative task of drafting
telephone harassment regulation. It suggests a way in which both
courts and legislatures can look at the constitutional issues raised
by such regulation, and it proposes a statute corresponding with
this view. The unique benefit of the proposed statute is that it attempts to codify speech and due process protections that the prevailing system provides, if at all, only through judicial construction
or prosecutorial discretion. Short of legislatures adopting statutes
similar to those proposed here, the law regarding telephone harassment will only become clearer if courts reach beyond the narrow
confines of conventional overbreadth and vagueness review to articulate the substantive limits of telephone harassment regulation.
As it now stands, the uncertainty in this area of the law has the
effect of chilling legislative experimentation. Just as courts are reluctant to break from the narrow pattern of conventional overbreadth and vagueness review, legislatures fearing the unknown
hesitate to depart from the typical, but inadequate, statutory
formulation.

